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Surveillance systems have been described as the nerve cells 
of public health with afferent arms receiving information, cell 
bodies analysing the information and efferent arms initiating 
appropriate action or further distribution of information [1]. 
Increasing numbers of scientific publications on the methodology 
and evaluation of surveillance systems seem to underline the 
importance of surveillance systems in public health. The most 
often cited references in these publications appear to be the 
definition of public health surveillance by Thacker and Berkelman 
[2] and variations thereof, and the recommendations for evaluating 
surveillance systems from 1988 [3] and its update from 2002 
written by working groups at the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) in the United States [4]. 
While surveillance certainly does need to be approached 
systematically, the evaluation of surveillance systems needs to 
be part of a broader strategy. One example of such a systematic 
evaluation strategy is the current evaluation process of all European 
Union Disease Surveillance Networks (DSN) coordinated by the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) [5]. 
Do such evaluations have a lasting and positive effect on the 
quality of the system? If public health surveillance needs to be 
continuous, should not evaluation of a surveillance system also 
be continuous? How do these evaluations fit into the concept of 
continuous quality assurance? 
Quality assurance is generally described as a 
continuous process to improve quality of a system; 
Decker called this the plan-do-check-act cycle [6]. 
In such a system, evaluation is only one component 
of quality assurance, typically followed by problem 
identification, problem analysis and intervention 
[6-8]. In hospital epidemiology in particular, it is 
acknowledged that surveillance is an effective 
component of quality assurance, yet little has been 
published about the role of quality assurance as a 
component of a surveillance system. In one of the 
few publications on this subject, Salman et al describe surveillance 
system evaluations as part of quality assurance in animal disease 
surveillance systems [9]. It is intriguing that most medical 
disciplines have adopted the principles of quality assurance as 
a continuous process, while epidemiology appears to maintain a 
static concept of quality control in surveillance management. On the 
other hand, one might argue that procedures such as the cleaning 
of databases, application of case definitions, standard operating 
procedures, and algorithms to detect statistical deviations are to 
be seen as part of an integrated quality assurance process. While 
this is undoubtedly true, there are multiple additional activities that 
could or should be part of a quality assurance effort.
When Germany enacted a new law on infectious disease 
control in 2001, the national surveillance system for notifiable 
infectious diseases was significantly restructured and expanded 
[10]. Simultaneously with the implementation of the system 
the Robert Koch-Institut (RKI) has applied a variety of activities 
to accompany and to influence the implementation by actively 
gathering feedback from participants or other interested parties of 
the surveillance system. Before implementation of the new system, 
surveys carried out in local health departments (LHD) provided 
baseline data for the design of the new system. A few months 
after the implementation of the new system, the RKI conducted 
focused group discussions among LHD officers to identify key 
challenges in the practical implementation of the new system 
[11]. These led to the instalment of technical info-mails and 
influenced the design and frequency of data feedback to LHD. 
Some of the hypotheses generated on the basis of these focused 
group discussions were then systematically assessed 
in a survey of all 430 local health departments [12]. 
The results of this survey had a major impact on 
the development and design of a number of tools 
such as SurvStat@RKI, a web-based interactive 
query system for surveillance data [13]. Additional 
information was gained through an interdisciplinary 
quality circle, as described in the report published 
in this Eurosurveillance issue [14], which was also 
complemented by larger surveys among general 
practitioners [15], laboratories [16] and recipients 
of the yearly epidemiological report. An example for 
a very specific aspect of evaluation was the application of a round 
robin methodology including all local health departments to assess 
the unambiguity and clarity of the national case definitions [17]. 
This resulted in a new structure and a thorough revision of the 
national case definitions [18], and has also contributed to the 
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revised version of the EU case definitions currently being finalised 
by ECDC. A number of capture-recapture analyses have provided 
a framework for estimating the completeness of reporting and thus 
an important aspect of the epidemiological interpretation [19]. 
All these activities are components of an ongoing effort to further 
improve the national surveillance systems for notifiable infectious 
diseases and have resulted in very practical consequences in the 
surveillance system. Admittedly, these components have not yet 
been scheduled for a systematic, intermittent reassessment of the 
progress, and therefore cannot be considered proof of an existing 
quality assurance system. One module which is, however, designed 
to contribute to continuous quality assurance is a direct result 
of the quality circle described in this issue. In 2004 the RKI 
established a special network of 45 representatively selected local 
health departments (LHD) (approximately 10% of the total number 
of LHD) to conduct regular workshops on technical issues of the 
surveillance system using a quality circle approach. This network, 
which has been working almost continuously, has enabled the RKI to 
better assess the needs of LHD and to pre-test various surveillance 
instruments such as questionnaires and reporting software. Similar 
approaches certainly exist in other countries. However, as far as can 
be seen from the current literature, continuous quality assurance 
is not well established in surveillance systems. If evaluations are 
integrated into such a quality assurance system they are likely to 
have more impact on the improvement of the system. It therefore 
seems worthwhile to assess how the concept of continuous quality 
assessment should and could be established in the design of 
surveillance systems. The current evaluation of DSN may be a 
good opportunity to start this process.
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